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Abstract
Hazard and harm to patients as well as inefficiencies associated with health care have been well
described as worldwide problems that result in hundreds of thousands of patient deaths and billions
of dollars of waste every year. The underlying causes for these problems have not been nearly so well
described; more importantly, generalizable mitigation strategies have not been effectively identified or
used. The current state of health care and patient safety will be discussed with particular attention to
the essential role that an engineering-based approach, which is heavily rooted in human factors and
ergonomics, must play if real and sustainable progress in the safe and efficient delivery of health care
is to be achieved. Specific case studies that illustrate the compelling opportunities for the application
of human factors and ergonomics–related knowledge will be discussed. C© 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Hazard and harm to patients that results from treat-
ment by their health-care system and providers is a
fact. This problem is world-wide, with a resultingmag-
nitude of harm reported to be in the hundreds of
thousands of patient deaths per year and billions of
dollars of waste (Baker, et al., 2004; Common-
wealth Department of Health and Family Services,
1996; Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000; Mogensen,
Poulsen, & Wendelboe, 2002). Discussion and litera-
ture dealing with harm to patients goes back many
decades (Bates et al., 1995; Brennan et al, 1991;
Schimmel, 1964/2003; Steel et al., 1981/2004). Al-
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though there are ample examples in the literature de-
scribing the undesirable outcomes that have occurred,
the health-care field has not been successful in devis-
ing and implementing strategies, tools, and techniques
that have been successfully and sustainably used on
a widespread basis. This lack of generalizable success
may stem from a continuing failure to identify the un-
derlying systems–based causes for these problems. In
many cases the search for causation ends with super-
ficial descriptions that are anything but systems based
and only identify human errors but do not examine
the underlying causes for the human errors. This re-
sponse of treating the symptoms instead of the un-
derlying causes is not the exclusive challenge of health
care but rather a characteristic demonstrated in many
circumstances when organizations are confronted
with mishaps resulting in catastrophic loss of life or
property.
In the health-care industry there has been a tradi-
tional emphasis on the individual autonomy of health-
care providers. Practitioner autonomy certainly is
appropriate to a certain extent because the diagnosis
and treatment of a patient needs to be responsive to the
specific needs of that patient. Individual autonomy can
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readily become counterproductive when it results in
practitioner and organizational behavior that is more
rooted in personal preferences, convenience, and tra-
dition rather than being evidence based. Examples of
unwarranted variation in health care are commonplace
(Bates 2007). For example, a common practice to treat
diabetic patients while they are receiving care in the
hospital is a technique called sliding scale insulin cov-
erage. This technique relies on the measurement of
the patient’s blood glucose level at periodic intervals
and then having the nurse administer insulin in vary-
ing amounts depending on the measured level of the
blood glucose. Using procedures where the nurse acts
as one of the elements in the closed feedback loop to
treat the patient is certainly not an inappropriate tech-
nique. A complicating factor arises, however, when the
nurse is caring for more than one diabetic patient on
sliding scale orders and each patient is under the care
of a different physician. In these situations it is en-
tirely possible that each patient has a different treating
physician who prescribed a different insulin dosage for
the same measured blood glucose level. Although it is
quite possible that each physician’s prescribed dosage
is medically correct from a technical perspective, such
variationmakes it increasingly likely that an individual
nursemay inadvertently give a particular patient a dose
of insulin thatwas not intended.Unfortunately, there is
often little, if any, active involvement of the physicians,
nurses, or hospital management to eliminate or reduce
this type of variation, which often offers the patient
no increased technical benefit but subjects the patient
to unnecessary risk. More importantly, this failure to
take action is more often than not due to failure to
detect or recognize that unnecessary variation is a risk
that can and should be addressed. Similar examples
extend to the area of medical practice and technique.
It is quite common to see substantial differences in the
way care is technically provided from one floor to an-
other in the same hospital as well as between one shift
and the next shift on the same nursing unit. Similarly,
the clinical approaches and techniques used by physi-
cians can vary dramatically among hospitals as well as
among physicians at an individual hospital and often
representwhat theywere taught in training, is their par-
ticular individual preference, or is the custom at their
particular location. This variation is often the result of
health-care practitioners being ignorant of the addi-
tional risk to which they are subjecting their patients
rather than the result of an explicit and intentional
choice that was made based on a careful consideration
of available evidence. Such ignorance of the advantages
that accrue from standardized work are to be expected
Figure 1 Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) 2003 National Patient Safety Goals
Boxscore.
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because formal training in these and other concepts
dealing with systems-based problem recognition and
solutions that take into account those factors affecting
systems and individual performance are not typically
available or recommended for health-care providers
during their training.
Technology, its use in the care of patients, and the
vulnerabilities and hazards that it introduces are other
areas that can have a catastrophic impact on patients.
In addition to the more straightforward issues, such
as software “bugs” and inadequate mechanical design,
an especially troublesome issue related to the design of
equipment so that it can be effectively and efficiently
used by practitioners. Displays and controls of medi-
cal devices and the documentation that accompanies
them often appear devoid of any human factors or
ergonomics (HFE) influence. Design inadequacies are
often not discovered until after a device has been re-
leased for sale. The application of formal effective us-
ability testing is the exception rather than the rule.
(Anderson et al., 2010 [Submitted for publ in this
issue]). Inadequacies that are discovered once the
device is in use are frequently addressed through
documentation-based interventions that essentially in-
struct the users to “be careful,” not a terribly robust or
effective countermeasure. For example, pumps have
existed that intravenously deliver medication to pa-
tients and have a user interface flawed to the extent
that nurses could unknowingly give doses that were
ten times higher than intended. When approached,
the manufacturer’s initial response was, in essence, “If
the nurses would just perform the task correctly there
wouldn’t be a problem.” Unfortunately, the design was
such that the nurse was not supplied with a clear in-
dication that the dose that the pump was delivering
was not what she or he had intended. Had effective
testing and evaluation been done prior to the market-
ing of the pump, this vulnerability could have been
detected and fixed prior to any patient being injured.
Other examples of design shortcomings exist in devices
such as are used in surgical and other procedures. For
instance, fiberoptic endoscopes that are used to exam-
ine a variety of body cavities have come under close
scrutiny in recent years because of difficulty in assur-
ing that they are properly cleaned after being used on
one patient and prior to being used on a subsequent
patient (Jolly et al., [submitted for publ in this issue];
VANational Center for Patient Safety Alerts, 2010). On
its surface, this task would appear to be trivial; how-
ever, once the complex set of tubing and other devices
that are involved are taken into consideration together
with the associated intricate and different procedures
required for each component, it is no wonder that fre-
quent problems regarding cleaning, disinfection, and
sterility arise. In this case, testing and analysis of not
only the operation of the scope during themedical pro-
cedure but also during the cleaning process would have
been of value. Usability testing informed by a knowl-
edge of HFE would have been of tremendous value.
Other evidence of the need for a systems-based ap-
proach that is heavily informed by a knowledge of HFE
can be seen in policy decisions where the VA National
Center for Patient Safety examined the effectiveness of
the Joint Commissions (TJC) National Patient Safety
Goals (NPSGs) (Figure 1) based on TJC data (The
Joint Commission, 2003). In comparing scheduled and
unannounced surveys to assess compliance of health-
care institutions on achieving the goals of the NPSGs
some interesting patterns were noticed. The compli-
ance of those goals that were more strongly rooted in
engineering-type solutions, the success of which was
not dependent on day-to-day vigilance and the per-
sonal performance of individuals, showed little differ-
ence in performance as compared to those that were
highly dependent on continued individual vigilance
and personal performance (Figure 2). This variation in
impact, or strength of action, was not anticipated by
TJC but if more HFE-type knowledge had been incor-
porated during the formulation of the NPSGs a greater
likelihood of success might have been achieved.
Design of the physical plant is another area that can
benefit fromHFE input. Examples include patient falls
that result in serious injury. Falls are a problem for vir-
tually all health-care facilities. Issues such as lighting
and reliable visual reference, balance, cognitive capa-
bility, and communication of information are all con-
tributors to fall injury. Appropriate design informed
by HFE expertise could contribute to the mitigation of
fall injury risk. Safety in magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) areas is another area in which HFE-informed
design could be put to good use. Strongmagnetic fields
are present in MRI facilities, and there have been nu-
merous cases in which ferromagnetic objects have in-
advertently been brought into the imaging areas result-
ing in fatal injuries and substantial damage (Figure 3).
Designs that address the various contributing factors
can reduce the likelihood of these events.
Individually based human performance issues also
contribute to events that harm patients. Factors such
as fatigue continue to present issues that negatively
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Figure 2 Percentage difference (±): Engineering only, engineering/behavior, behavior only.
Figure 3 Magnetic resonance imaging. Photo courtesy of www.simplyphysics.com.
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impact patient care. Although fatigue and its impact
have begun to be addressed with regard to physician
training programs, there has been little or no activ-
ity to address the practices of health-care providers
after they have completed their training programs. In-
terventions that go beyond the overly simplistic in-
terventions of work hour regulation are needed and
should include interventions that address both edu-
cation and fatigue management strategies and tech-
niques. Inadequate communication is cited as being
the single largest cause of patient safety–related events
(Lingard et al., 2004; Sutcliffe, Lewton, & Rosen-
thal, 2004; The Joint Commission’s Annual Report,
2007). This communication involves not just writ-
ten communications but especially verbal communi-
cation among various health-care professionals, espe-
cially in situations where authority gradients play a
role. Because health care is a hierarchical field, it is
not surprising that communication has been identi-
fied as a primary problem. Interventions such as Med-
ical Team Training have begun to be applied primar-
ily in the operating rooms and intensive care units,
but its use is far from widespread (Neily et al., 2010).
There are many areas in which the application of
HFE knowledge can positively impact the delivery of
health care from not only a safety perspective but also
from an effectiveness and efficiency standpoint. The
opportunities run the gamut from equipment and
physical plant design to process issues that address
organizational as well as personal factors. In some cases
re-engineering of existing facilities, equipment, and
processes is what is required. In others, new tools and
approaches are needed (Bakdash & Drews [submitted
for publ in this issue]; Drews et al. [submitted for
publ in this issue]; Bradley [submitted for publ in this
issue]; Williams [submitted for publ in this issue];
Lesselroth et al., [submitted for publ in this issue]).
There is not a general understanding by the health-care
community that HFE-related issues represent some
of the fundamental causes of the problems that are
currently encountered. There is also little knowledge
of the capabilities that HFE professionals possess.
It is imperative that the HFE community take the
initiative to become involved in the solution to these
health care–related problems. Health care–related
problems amenable to HFE-based solutions are
present on a global basis, and there is a growing
appreciation that these problems need to be dealt
with. Venues where HFE can have an impact range
from device and software manufacturers and ven-
dors, to regulatory bodies, to health-care delivery
organizations such as hospitals and hospital systems.
This is an opportunity for the HFE community
to make a significant contribution. IT MUST ACT
NOW.
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